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The Act of 1864, known as the Flowage Act (Rev. of 1866, p. 89), is not
unconstitutional. The decision to this effect in Olmstead v. Camp, 33 Conn. R.
532, confirmed upon full argument.
It is no objection to proceedings under the Flowage Act, that the mill is not on
the same tract of land upon which the dam is sought to be erected, and that land
belonging wholly to other parties lies between.
Where the petitioners had called on two landowners to state on what terms each
would allow his land to be flowed, and one had declined to give any answer and
the otler had demanded more than the petitioners were willing to give, it was held
to be a case where the parties were "unable to agree as to the damages to be
paid," within the meaning of the statute.
Where the committee, upon a petition for authority to raise an existing dam to
a greater height, in their report stated the authorized height merely as so much
additional height to the existing dam, it was held that they had fixed the height
with sufficient certainty.
The provision of the state constitution (Art. 1, § 11), that private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation, is not to be regarded
as a grant of power to the legislature, but as a restriction upon the exercise of the
right of eminent domain already existing. [BUTLER and CARPENTER, JJ.]
The legislature may lawfully grant rights of easement to individuals or corpora"tionsto enable them to erect and operate structures, if the result of their operation
is the production of an article or thing intended to be furnished or sold to the
public for a beneficial use, and to supply their reasonable wants. [BUTLER and
CARPENTER, JJ.]

PFTITIo under the Flowage Act, praying for authority to raise
a mill-dam above its existing height, and for the assessment of

damages to the several respondents, whose lands would be overflowed thereby. There were three petitioners, and the petition
alleged that they were severally the owners of mills on Stony
Brook, running out from Paug Pond, and that all their mills were
supplied with water from the pond, the dam beilag situated at the
outlet of the pond. The petition was brought to the Superior
Court in New Haven county, and was referred to a committee,
under the statute, who reported:-

That the flowing of the land would be of public use; and the
height to which the dam might be built by the petitioners to be
"such a height as will raise the water of Paug Pond three feet

above the height to which the waters of the pond would be raised
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by the dam as it stood at the date of the petition, namely, on the
23d day of February 1865."
The committee then assessed the damages of the respondents,
and farther reported:" That the dam is situated on a piece of land belonging to the
petitioners, separated from each of the pieces of land on which
the water-mills and manufacturing establishments of the petitioners
are situated, by several intervening pieces of land belonging to
several and different owners, and not belonging to the petitioners
or any of them."
The respondents excepted to the report, because the dam is not
situated on the same land upon which any of the water-mills
mentioned in the petition are located; because testimony that the
flowing of the -lands in the manner proposed would be of public
use was 'inadmissible, and the committee were not authorized to
inquire whether or not it would be of public use to flow said lands
by means of a dam erected upon land no part of which was connected with or attached to the land upon which any one of the
water-mills mentioned in the petition was located; because the act
under which the proceedings were had is uneonstitutional, and
because. the finding and report of the committee are indefinite,
vague, and uncertain, and not in conformity with the requirements
of the statute, and do not show with certainty the height to which'
said proposed dam. may be raised, nor will the record show with
certainty the matter attempted to be determined.
The respondents also filed an answer, denying that the erection
of said dam is or will.be of or for public use; and moved that the
court shall inquire for itself whether the erection of said proposed
dam is or will be of or for public use.
The Superior Court (PARDEE, J.) overruled the exception,
accepted the report, and decreed accordingly.
With regard to the raising of the dam being of public use, the
court found "1that the raising of said dam in the manner and to
the extent recommended in the report of said committee, will
furnish such increased quantity of water for the use of the several
mills on Stony :Brook, which are described in detail in said petition, as will enable the owners thereof to operate them during
portions of the year in which they cannot now be operated by
reason of an insufficient supply of water, and will thus increase
the power, value, and usefulness of said several mill privileges,
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and therefore is of public use; which fact is found upon evidence
the whole of which was objected to by the respondents."
With regard to the parties being unable to agree as to the
damages to be paid, the court found that the petitioners, prior to
the bringing of the petition, asked the respondents, William,
Joel, and Horace Austin, to state the price for which they would
convey to them the right to flow so much of their land as would
be covered by water in consequence of raising the water in the
pond to the various heights of two, three, and four feet above
the point to which it could be raised by the dam then existing at
the outlet of the pond; in reply to which they stated certain terms
which the petitioners were unwilling and refused to accept; and
these respondents made no other proposition. Also that the petitioners applied to the respondent Elliott to state to them the price
for which he would convey the right to flow his land, by raising
the water in the pond three feet higher than it could be raised by
the dam then existing; to which he declined to make any answer.
The court thereupon found that the petitioners were unable to
agree with the respondents, or either of them, as to the damage,
or as to the judgment that should be rendered.
The respondents brought the record before this court by a
motion in error.

H. B. Harrison (with whom were Blackman and .lliott), for
the plaintiffs. in error.-1. The Flowagd Act is unconstitutional.
It is not within the constitutional power of the General Assembly
to authorize, directly or indirectly, one man to take and appropriate to his private use (either with or without compensation) the
property of another: V'arick v. Smith, 5 Paige 137, 159; Matter of Albany Street, 11 Wend. 148; Wilkinson v. Leland, 2
Peters 627; Hay v. ohoes Co., 3 Barb. 47; Hartwell v. Armstrong, 19 Id. 166; West Biver Bridge v. Dix, 6 How. 544;
Bradley v. N. York and N. Haven Railroad Co., 21 Conn. 305;
Norwich Gas Light 0o. v. Norwich aty Gas do., 25 Id. 19, 88;
Woodruff v. Aeal, 28 Id. 169; Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill 140;
(lack v. White, 2 Swan 540; Sadler v. Langham, 34 Ala. 311;
Harding v. Goodlett, 3 Yerger 41; Commonwealth v. Sawin, 2
Pick. 548, 549; Commonwealth v. Cambridge, 7 Mass. 158, 167;
Constitution of Conn., Art. 1, §§ 8, 9, 11, 12, 21. The reasoning by
which courts in certain states have sustained the mill acts of those

TODD v. AUSTIN.

states does not apply in support of this law. The mill acts of
Massachusetts, for instance, rest upon peculiarities of the common
law of that state in relation to the rights of proprietors of land
traversed by mill-streams-peculiarities directly in conflict with
the common law of England and of Connecticut: iurdock v.
Stickney, 8 Cush. 116; Bates v. Weymouth Iron Co., Id. 548;
.Jordanv. Woodward, 40 Maine 322; TFilliams v. School -District,
33 Vt. 278; lVewcomb v. Smith, 1 Chandler 71; .ngraham v.
JHutchinson, I Conn. 590; King v. Tiffany, 9 Id. 168; Buddington v. Bradley, 10 Id. 218; Parker v. G-riswold, 17 Id. 288;
Thurber v. Jfartin, 2 Gray 394; Thonipson v. Crocker, 9 Pick.
a9; Angell on Watercourses, § 340.
2. At any rate, the act, if constitutional, "steps to the verge
of the constitutional limit," and must be construed with the utmost
rigor against those who try to seize property under it, and in favor
of those whose property they try to seize. No proceeding under
it should be sustained unless it is brought within both the letter
and the spirit of the act: .Nichols v. Bridgeport, 23 Conn. 208;
Jordanv. JToodward,40 Maine 322; Williams v. School District,
23 Vt. 278. This case does not come within either the letter or
the spirit of the act. The act provides only for those cases where
the mill and the dam are on the "same" piece of land and under
the control of the same person. It does not authorize, or intend
to authorize, any petitioner to flood the land of a respondent,
except in a case where the petitioner possesses the right of turning to some use the privilege seized by him under the act. If the
mill is separated from the dam by land not owned or controlled
by the petitioner, then the petitioner, after raising his dam to the
injury of the respondent, will not be able to apply to his mill the
water thus obtained. The words "on the same," in section 388,
were accordingly introduced for the express purpose of preventing
the act from applying to cases like this: Farringtonv. Blish, 14
Maine 423; Hurdock v. Stickney, 8 Cush. 117; Bates v. TFeymouth Iron Co., Id. 552.
3. It is not properly found, within the trae intent of the requirement of section 388, that the petitioners could not "agree" with
the respondents "as to the damages to be paid."
4. The record does not "show with certainty the matter" that
has been "determined," within the true intent and meaning of the
same section.
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Watrous and IRogers, for the defendants in error.
MCOURDY, J.-The principal point raised in this case-the
constitutional question-was decided, after full consideration, in
the case of Otmstead v. Camp, 83 Conn. R. 532. But as the
question was one of great interest, and it was suggested that new
views might be presented bearing especially on the particular
facts of this case, a very elaborate argument was again listened
to by the court.
It was claimed that in Mlassachusetts, wherie the flowage laws
were said to have originated, and where they have been more
frequently discussed and sustained than in any other state, principles in relation to the rights of mill-owners and riparian proprietors have been recognised as a part of their common law
somewhat different from those which exist in this state and elsewhere.
However this may be, we do not understand that in that state,
or in any other of the many which have enacted and upheld such
laws, their defence has been placed upon any peculiarity of their
common law. They are everywhere justified upon the broad
ground of a paramount right of the government to take private
property, upon making compensation, in cases of necessity or
great public utility. It is this general authority, which, in the
opinion given in the case referred to, we have e.ndeavoured to
explain and sustain by considerations which seemed to be appropriate. We see no occasion to change the views then expressed.
But it is urged that the statute provides only for a dam to be
raised on the land of the mill-owner or that of another by his
consent, and if it is erected on the land of the mill-owner, it must
be on the identical tract on which the mill stands; and it appears
in this case that the dam stands on a lot of the petitioners separate from the mill-site; the land of another person lying between
the two tracts. We are unable to see any force in this objection.
The object of the clause relied on is to require ihat the dam shall
be built on a site where the owner has a right to place it. This
right may result from his own ownership or from an agreement
with the proprietor. The words "on the same" refer to the antecedents, "his own land" or "land of another." There is no conceivable reason for requiring the mill and the dam to be on precisely the same tract.
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The respondents further object that it does not sufficiently
appear that the parties were not able to agree in relation to thl
damages. This is a question of fact, and the Superior Court has
found that they were unable to agree. If it were proper to reexamine the question, we should conclude that the evidence
abundantly justified the finding. The petitioners called on threspondents to state their terms for the privilege of flowing: On-,,
party made no answer, and the other named so large a sum that
the proposition was rejected.
Another objection to the report of the committee is, that they do
not establish with sufficient certainty the height to which the dani
may be raised. It would unquestionably have'seemed more definite if they had established the height by marks upon a rock, or
pillar, or some other permanent object. But we have a right to
presume that the height to which the petitioners were entitled wa.
well known and established by some such mark, and the committee, taking that for their basis, allow a certain number of additional
feet.
We see no error in the proceedings, and the decree is affirmed.
In this opinion PA~iK, J., concurred.
BUTLER, J.-I
was fully satisfied at the conclusion of the argument in Olmstead v. Camp, 33 Conn. 532, that the flowage law
was sustainable upon strict and recognised principles of constitutional law; and a re-examination of the question has confirmed.
rather than shakeii, that opinion.
Like every other question of constitutional power exercised by
the legislature under our state constitution, it presents itself to
the mind in a three-fold aspect, and logically involves a three-fold
inquiry.
First.-Whether the power exercised is delegated by the people
to the legislature-in and by the constitution specifically, or by a
general grant of power sufficiently comprehensive to embrace it.
Second.-Whether the exercise of the power as exercised conflicts with the Constitution and laws of the United States, or with
any other provision of the constitution of this state. And,
Third.-Whether the exercise of the power in the particular
case and manner is contrary to natural justice. For, as it is to be
conclusively presumed that the people, while possessing the power,
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would not have exercised it contrary to that fundamental principle
of the social compact, it is in like manner to be presumed that
they did not intend to delegate and have not delegated the power
so to exercise it to the legislature. An unjust use of the power
is therefore an abuse of it and void.
We come then to the application of these inquiries to the case
in hand. And flrst,-What is the power which has been exercised, and is it delegated in the Constitution?
The power exercised is the right of eminent domain, which is
a part of the legislative power, and is unquestionably delegated
in the 1st clause of the 3d article of the Constitution. This
right is a paramount right attached to every man's land, and he
holds it subject to its exercise. Bouvier defines it to be the right
which the people or government retain over the estates of individuals to resume the same for public use; and that definition is
sufficiently comprehensive and in accordance with the authorities.
2. The law in question does not conflict with the Constitution
or laws of the United States, or any provision of the constitution
of this state. There is a clause in the bill of rights requiring
just compensation to be made when the power is exercised, and
as a condition of its exercise. Much misconception has prevailed
in relation to the nature of that clause, but it is simply a condition
attached to the exercise of the right of eminent domain. It does
not purport to be a grant of power, but recognises its existence.
Its import is precisely what it would be if the language used had
been, "the right of eminent domain shall not be -exercised unless
just compensation be made for the property taken." The convention which framed the Constitution of 1818 was composed of
very able men, many of them distinguished jurists. They framed
a constitution remarkably concise, clear, and unambiguous.
Whatever they intended to say they said, and in simple language,
so that it could be understood by the people. They knew, when
they provided that the whole legislative power should vest in the
legislature, that the right, of eminent domain would vest as a parr
of it, and they did not except it. They therefore intended it
should vest. So when they framed the condition to be attached t,
its exercise, they did not use the words "eminent domain," for those
words would not have been intelligible to the people, but they did
use the precise language employed by jurists to define and describe
that right. It is evident therefore that they intended to attach
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the condition to the exercise of that right merely, and there is not
in that clause, or anywhere else in the constitution, ground for
suspicion even, that they intended to define or limit in any way
or manner the right itself. The law in question complies with the
condition and is not in conflict.
3. The principal objections to the law are founded on the
assumption that it is contrary to natural justice. I am satisfied
that it is not. The right to take private property for public use,
or of eminent domain, is a reserved right attached to every man's
land, and paramount to his right of ownership. He holds his land
subject to that right, and cannot complain of injustice when it is
lawfully exercised. The right consists of two elements,-the
right to take, and the right to judge of and determine the exigency and the necessity for taking it. These are both and equally
vested in the legislature. Bouvier (Law Dictionary) says, "It
belongs to the legislature to decide what improvements are of sufficient irbportance to justify the exercise of the right of eminent
domain." And the authorities cited fully sustain him. It is for
the legislature, therefore, to determine what is required by the
wants of the people, or for the public good, in the exercise of a
sound discretion. With the bond fide and not unreasonable exercise of that discretion courts cannot interfere. As the legislature
in this case have exercised their discretion honestly, deliberately,
and after much agitation of the subject, and the law is confessedly
beneficial to the public interest, there would seem to be no question
about its constitutionality.
But several objections are made on the ground that the right is
limited to actual governmental or individual use, and they must be
fairly examined.
The objections are made in various forms, but they may all be
resolved, substantially, into two classes. The first class of objectors
ignore entirely the fact that the right of eminent domain is
granted in the constitution as part of the legislative power, and
assume the grant to be by the clause in the bill of rights; and
further assume that every man is the absolute owner of his property, and that the grant is an invasion of that ownership; and
then argue that the grant is in derogation of common right, and
to be strictly construed; and therefore that the terms "public
use" should be construed to be a use by the government, its officers
and agents only. As this objection is founded on an ignorance of
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the existence of the right of eminent domain in the legislature
independent of the clause in question, a false assumption in relation to the character of that clause, and a false assumption as to
the absolute ownership of the property, and is wholly unsupported
by authority, it is entitled to no consideration.
The second class of objectors concede the right of eminent
domain in the legislature, but claim that the clause in the bill of
rights is an implied prohibition against taking the property for
any other purpose, and that the words "public use" must be construed to mean an actual personal use by the government or by
individual members of the public. I do not think the claim that
the clause in the bill of rights contains an implied prohibition is
correct, or see its materiality if it is. It is the essence of the right
of eminent domain that the property shall be taken "for public use,"
and the question remains open, what is the meaning of the words,
and who is to determine what constitutes such use, whether there
be such a prohibition or not.
But suppose it admitted that some actual use by the public is
essential to the just exercise of the right of eminent domain, the
law will still be constitutional.
This class of objectors concede that grants of rights of easement to railroad companies, water companies for the distribution
of water in cities and villages, and gas light companies, are constitutional, because they say the public use them. -But let us see
what use the public make of them. A. takes his goods to the
railroad, pays the freight to their place of destination, places
them in the cars, or they are placed there by the employees of the
company, and they are transported pursuant to his contract.
Now to have the use of a thing in the sense in which the objectors
use the words, is to have some exclusive occupation and control
of it. What use or control has A. of the road, its equipments or
operation, by reason of the fact that he has shipped his goods
upon it? None whatever. If he can be said .touse anything it
is the transportation,the result or product of the use and operation of the road and its equipments by the company. Nor is the
case different if he applies for transportation for himself, except
in the deceptive particular that, being animate and having the
power of locomotion, he is expected to place himself upon the
train instead of being placed there by the employees of the company. In all other respects he is as much the passive recipient of
VOL. XVII.-2
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transportation,as the result or product of the operation of the
road, as his inanimate goods. So too of the water power company. The public have no use of the franchise or structure, nor
control of its operations. All they have is the use of the water
delivered to them by the operation of the structures as used and
controlled by the company. The same is true of the gas light
company.
The following proposition then may be deduced from the three
instances alluded to and conceded to be constitutional, viz. :
The legislature may lawfully grant rights of easement to individuals or corporations to enable them to erect and operate structures, if the result of their operation is the production of an
article or thing intended to be furnished or sold to the public for
a beneficial use, and to supply their reasonable wants.
This proposition covers the case in hand as perfectly as it does
either of the other three, for the fiowage law is intended to grant
rights of easement which will enable individuals or corporations
to enlarge or erect and operate structures, the result or product
of the operation of which will be articles (such as cotton or woollen
cloth and the like) intended to be sold to the public for their
necessary and beneficial use. And if there be any element of
public use in the other cases or either of them, it is contained in
the law in question, and it is constitutional upon the principles
claimed or conceded by this class of objectors.
But there is no such limitation, nor any specific limitation to
the bond fide exercise of their discretion by the legislature, known
to the law. The cases cited from Kent are not cases of limitation, but of arbitrary power, exercised pretendedly and fraudulently,
under cover of- the right. If the true nature ot the right of eminent domain, and the true object a-d operation of the clause in
the bill of rights are regarded, all difficulties vanish; and I have
yet to hear or read the first argument or opinion adverse to the
law in question, having any, plausibility, which was not founded
on a misconception of one or the other. A distinguished judge,
even, speaks of the taking and grant "as a forced sale ;" but if
such were their character they could not stand an instant. The
legislature cannot compel one man to sell to another. The true
theory and principle of the matter is, that the legislature resume
dominion over the property, and having resumed it, instead of
using it by their agents, to effect the intended public good, and to
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avoid entanglement in the common business of life, they revest it
in other individuals or corporations, to be used by them, in such
manner as to effect directly or indirectly, or incidentally as the
case may be, the public good intended. And it is perfectly immaterial to the owner of the property in what manner the legislature
use it or cause it to be used after they have resumed it and he is
justly and fully compensated. Ile has on that acoount no ground
for complaint. 'Upon the strictest principles, therefore, I consider
the law constitutional.
Upon the other points I also concur with the majority of the
court.
CARPENTER,

5., concurred in both the foregoing opinions.

HINAN, C. J., dissented.
The importance and acknowledged
difficulty of the question so extensively
discussed in the opinion of Mr. Justice
BUTLER in the foregoing case, would
certainly justify an extended examination of its grounds. But we should not
desire to do this, as a general thing,
unless we felt some confidence we might
aid in bringing the public opinion, or
the judicial opinion of the public, to a
different result at some future time.
This is always hopeful, where the course
of judicial decision is both wrong in
principle and inconvenient in its practical operation. In such a case the inconvenience of the rule constantly
prompts to revision and agitation until
the obstinacy of judicial blindness is
compelled to see, and to retrace its error.
But where the error, in principle, is of
so long standing as in the present case,
and fortified by such repeated acts of
legislative confirmation, and above all,
where it is farther supported by all public opinion, and the convenience of multitudes, against the remonstrances of here
and there a churlish landowner, there is
small hope that the speculative error of
the law will ever be made so obvious as
to induce the majority of judicial tribunals in the states where these "Iill

Laws" exist to retrace their steps, and
declare them, or the decisions in regard
to them, based on wrong grounds. There
are two systems of "Mill Laws," one
called the Massachusetts, and the other
the V'irginia system, with reference to
the states where they had their origin.
In the former the statute only gives the
right to flow the land of another against
his will, for the purpose of extending a
mill-pond or water-power. There is
here no attempt to take the land for, or
to transfer any interest in the land to,
the owner of the mill. And although
the statutes, in some of the states, following this class of laws, may declare
the right to flow the land for mill purposes, and to continue the dam after the
recovery of damages for its continuance
hitherto, yet this may be regarded as
nothing more than the form of affirming that the party whose land is thus
flowed shall have no redress, by way of
injunction out of chancery, against continuing the dam, and no right to appeal
to a common-law court to remove the
nuisance, prosternerenocunentum, and no
right to abate the nuisance by his own
act; in short, that he shall have no
remedy except to have his damages annually assessed by a jury. Treating the
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statutes of this class as a mere prescription of the exclusive remedy for an
acknowledged wrong, we see no very
clear ground to complain of their constitutionality. But where it is attempted to
be placed upon the ground of right, as
coming fairly within the range of exercising the prerogative power of eminent
domain, it has always seemed to us exceedingly questionable.
And we understaud Chief Justice
SHAW to have always placed the constitutionality of these statutes on other
grounds than that of the exercise of the
right of eminent domain by the sovereign
power of the state : Murdock v. Stickney,
8 Cush. 113. But in Talbott v. Hdson,
24 Law Reporter 228, BIGELOW, C. J.,
seems to regard these laws as a mere
assertion of the right of eminent domain. And the last case, as well as
that of Hazen v. The BEssex Co., 12
Cush. 475, where the statute authorized
one water-power to be so extended as to
ruin another, there seems no very obvious mode of defending the proceeding,
unless it can be done upon the plea that
it is a legitimate exercise of the right
of eminent domain. No other mode
occurs to us at present, unless we can
say that it is only the provision of a
peculiar remedy in a special class of
cases. And we might be satisfied with
this view if the statute, in terms, or by
fair construction, could be made to apply
to classes of cases, as where one destroys
property Of another to escape greater
loss himself. But it seems to be pro- vided only for the particular cases, and
not to come within the class of statutes
affecting procedure, which always apply
to classes of cases. It looks, therefore,
in these cases, very much like the exercise of sovereign power under the claim
of the reserved right to apply land, or
the use of it, to, public use. And in
Jordan v. Woodward, 40 Me. 317,
RicE, J., seems to treat the proceedings
as the exercise of the right of eminent

domain, and declares that these "Mill
Acts" are Ihe taking of the use of one
man's land for the benefit or use of another, and that this is going to the very
extreme verge of constitutional right,
and, if new, would be held unconstitutional. And the principal case, as well
as that of Olmstead v. Camp, 33 Conn.
532, upon which the decision rests,are
placed upon the ground of the lawful
exercise of the right of eminent domain.
And we understand the Supreme Court
of New Hamshire have recently determined the same question, in a very
'elaborate opinion, which is not reported,
but in wlich the court vindicate the constitutionality of these laws, and, as we
infer, upon the ground of the right of
eminent domain.
This is such an array of authority
that we should have little hope of it ever
being changed, and especially when these
laws are so popular, and those who
doubt their validity so little regarded.
It seems to be a case where might makes
right, by common consent, and the judiciary have no function remaining but to
assign the best reason they can for a
The case of
foregone conclusion.
Moore v. Wright, 34 Alabama 311, is
the only case where these laws have been
held unconstitutional, as far as we know.
And this case was under a statute like
those of Virginia. But we are not sure
the cases differ essentially in principle,
if both are attempted to be placed upon
the ground of the exercise of the right
of eminent domain. For in that view
it cannot affect the principle very essentially whether you take the land or the
use of it. And, indeed, there is no
essential difference between taking a perpetual use of land and the land itself.
The injury is much the same in either
case.

But it seems to us there is an essential
difference in the two classes of eases in
one particular. In none of the Massachusetts cases is there any attempt to
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transfer any estate in the land or in the
use of it, from the owner, and to vest it
in the millowner. In some eases the
use is taken by the millowner and in
others the mill is destroyed; but in
neither case is any estate transferred.
And if in both of these classes of eases
the statute had simply provided that the
injured party should only recover in a
particular mode and to a certain extent,
there could he no question of the validity
of the statute. And it seems to us, from
the reasoning of the judges in all the
earlier Massachusetts cases, that there
was no expectation of defending the constitutional validity of the statutes upon
any such broad ground as that of eminent domain. rAn Tn,C.J., in Sewall
v. 17agg, 11 Mass. 364, said the act
seemed to be incautiously drawn upon
the plan of, or in too close conformity
with, the Colonial Acts.
But the statutes following the lead of
those in Virginia must stand, if at all,
upon the right of eminent domain, and
this may have led to placing them all,
of both classes, upon that ground. But
it seems to us almost equivalent to saying, that the legislature may always take
private property for the public good, and
that is equivalent to saying they may
always take it for what they regard the
public good. For the public good is
so indefinite a term, that courts will
consider that the legislature must be as
capable of-deciding that question as any
other tribunal. It being a question of
fact, mainly, it is scarcely subject to
revision by the courts. If there is any
evidence of its being for the public good
the act must stand-and a case will
seldom occur that a statute would pass
the legislature, on any ground, against

all the evidence of its character and
quality.
It seems to us, therefore, that there is
no security in giving this right of eminent domain so wide an extension. It
becomes practically the same as saying
the legislature may take private property
when they choose, and apply it to such
uses as they deem public uses. If it
were limited to purposes of intercommunication, or education, or health, or
public defences, or those well-known
and clearly defined public uses for which
all codes of law provide, there could be
no uncertainty, and no cause for the
exercise of arbitrary powers but where
it is extended to mills of every class and
character, most of which are mere pecuniary ventures, no more connected with
public use than any other commercial
enterprise, it may as well include public
inns, or public stables, or hospitals, or
asylums, or, indeed, almost any public
comfort or convenience. We can only
say that it seems to us exceedingly to be
regretted that the doctrine of Chief
Justice Susw had not been more heeded
and more strictly followed, but there is,
perhaps, little hope ii will ever be again
possible to bring back the public mind to
any such salutary rule. And we fear
there is a growing laxity in regard to
judicial constructions, based upon supposed public demand and modern advancement, which has no foundation in
fact, and which will ultimately be sure
to unsettle all the old foundations.
'We desire to disclaim all morbid dread
of reasonable conformity to advancing
developments. But the thing is a convenient cover for all error.
I. F. R.

COOLIDGE v. GUTHIIRIE.

United States Cireuit Court, Southern Distriet of Ohio.
HENRY P. COOLIDGE v. COLUMBUS B. GUTHRIE.
An officer commanding troops of the United States in an insurgent state, during
the late civil war, seized property of a citizen of the state, and after acquiring firm
possession, sold it to a third person. After the war the owner at the time of the
seizure brought an action of trover for the value of the cotton against the purchaser, in the Circuit Court of the United States.
Held, That the court had no jurisdiction. The seizure was made as an act of
war, and its validity was not triable in a municipal court, in a common-law proceeding.
That this defence was admissible under the general issue in trover.
That after complete possession of the cotton by the captor for twenty-four hours
it became booty by the laws of war, and the title of the hostile owner was completely extinct. If the plaintiff in this case had any right it was against the
United States.

THIS was an action of trover brought to recover the value of
cotton mentioned in the plaintiff's declaration. The defendant
pleaded the general issue. The parties submitted the cause to the
court-waiving the intervention of a jury.
According to the statute regulating the practice in such cases
"the finding of the court upon the facts-which finding may be
either general or special-shall have the same effect as the finding
of a jury."
* * "When the finding is special, the review"
(by the Supreme Court of the United States) "may extend to
the sufficiency of the facts found to support the judgment." (Act
of March 3d 1865, ch. 86, § 4, 13 Stat. 501.) As this case was
important in the principles which it involved, it was deemed proper
to find the facts specially.
The facts were accordingly found upon the evidence as follows:
1. On the 12th of July 1862, General Samuel R. Curtis, commanding an army of the United States, took military possession
of the town of Helena, in the state of Arkansas. That state was
then in rebellion against the United States.
2. The cotton was all raised upon farms belonging to General
Gideon J. Pillow, who was, at the time of the seizure of the cotton, in the military service of the rebel government. The farms
were in the immediate vicinity of Helena.
3. General Curtis ordered the cotton in controversy to be seized
and brought into Helena; and it was seized and brought there
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accordingly. The wagons conveying it were protected by troops
detailed for that purpose.
4. He sold and delivered the cotton to the defendant and one
William W. Babcock, jointly. There were two sales-one of 200
bales, and one of 86 bales. Both sales were made at Helena, on
the 26th of Iuly 1862. The agreed price was 143 cents per
pound. The average weight of the bales was 400 pounds.
5. Subsequently the defendant Guthrie delivered 82 bales of the
cotton to Alfred Spink, at Memphis, pursuant to the order of a
quartermaster of the army. Spink paid Guthrie $45 per bale for
the cotton so delivered. Fourteen bales more of the cotton were
taken by a gunboat, to be used, as was alleged, for caulking purposes. The residue, consisting of 140 bales, was shipped by the
defendant to the city of New York, and there sold.
6. General Curtis alleged at the time of the seizure and sale
of the cotton that-his object was to apply the proceeds to the support of the starving negro population'in the neighborhood of his
camp. A small part of the proceeds were so applied. He received full payment for the cotton at the contract price. He
never reported the seizure and sale to the authorities at Washington nor to any other public officer, and died without having
accounted for the proceeds to any one.'
7. When the defendants bought the cotton it had been for several days at Helena in the military possession of- General Curtis.
It was in a damaged condition. The navigation of the Mississippi
was at that time attended with peril to life and property. Babcock was killed at a landing twenty miles below Memphis, by
guerrillas, on the 20th of October 1862. The value of the cotton
at the time and place of purchase was 14J cents per pound-what
the defendant and Babcock paid for it. The whole quantity of
the cotton purchased and received by the defendant and Babcock
was 94,400 pounds. The legal title and ownership of the cotton
at the time of its seizure by General Curtis.was in the plaintiff,
Coolidge. He was a resident of Arkansas, but was in no wise
engaged in the rebellion. All the facts relating to the cotton
were known to the defendant and Babcock when they purchased.
I The court doubtless found the facts as they were shown by the evidence or
admitted by the counsel for the defendant, but the court says, "1no Act of Congress
had then been passed" regulating such seizures, and we are advised from another
source that General Curtis satflied the Government that all the moneys which he
so received were expended in the public service.-EDs. Ax. L.tw REG.
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Geo. H. -Pendletonand Thomas I. .Yey, for plaintiff.
Sage & Hinkle, for defendant.

Opinion of the court by
SWAYNE, J.-The plaintiff is entitled to recover unless the
grounds of defence relied upon by the defendant shall be found
sufficient to protect him. If liable, the measure of his liability is
the value of the entire amount of the cotton which he received,
at 14i cents per pound, with interest from the 20th day of July
1862, the time of the alleged conversion. If he was then guilty
of an illegal and wrongful act touching the cotton, his liability
*as fixed at that time, and the subsequent delivery to another of
82 bales, upon the order of the quartermaster, and the taking of
14 bales by the gunboat, can have no retroactive operation or in
any wise affect the amount for which he must respond. Where
property is tortiously taken, every one who receives it and exercises acts of ownership over it is guilty of a conversion and is liable
for its full value, without reference to the liabilities of others
through whose hands it may also have passed, either before or
after the conversion by the defendant: Williams & Chapin v.
Marle, 11 Wend. 81.
In the eye of the law the order of the quartermaster, and the
act of the gunboat, are immaterial facts in the case, and may be
laid out of view.
Two defences are relied upon by the defendant Guthrie.
1. That this court has no jurisdiction of the case.
2. That as soon as- General Curtis acquired a firm possession of
the property, by having it conveyed infra prcesidia,the title of
the plaintiff became ipso facto extinguished, and a complete title
vested in the United States; and that if the plaintiff have any
rights left in respect to the cotton, they must be asserted against
the United States, and that he has none which can be enforced
against the defendant.
When the transaction occurred the rebellion had risen to the
proportions of a civil war, and was fully flagrant. Arkansas was
enemy's territory, and all the property there was enemy property.
Cotton was an article of foreign and domestic commerce. It was
one of the main sinews of the power of the insurgents. They
relied upon it for the purchase of arms and other munitions of
war, and chiefly to supply them with financial means for the pro-
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secution of the strife. Important belligerent rights were conceded
to them by the government of the nation. Their soldiers, when
captured, were treated as prisoners of war. They were exchanged,
and not held for treason. Their vessels when captured were
dealt with by our prize courts. Their ports were blockaded, and
the blockades proclaimed to neutral powers, and property found
on board such vessels, belonging to persons residing in the rebel
states, was uniformly held to be confiscable as enemy property.
All these things were done as if the war had been a public one
with a foreign power: The _Pize Cases, 2 Black 687; Mrs.
Alexander's (otten, 2 Wall. 417; tauran v. Insurance Co., 6
Id. 1.
No Act of Congress had then been passed which affects the
case. No regulations issued by any department of the government prior to that time, relating to the subject, have been brought
to our attention. The Acts of August 6th 1861 and of July 17th
1862 have no application.
General Curtis and his army are to be regarded, for the purposes of this case, as if prosecuting hostilities in a foreign country
with which the United States were at war, and the case is to be
decided upon the principles of law, applicable in that condition
of things.
1. In respect to the defence first mentioned, the inquiry arises
whether it should not have been presented by a special plea, and
whether it can be considered under the general issue.'
The question is the same whether a seizure jure belli be made
upon land or water. The case of Lecaux v. Eden, 2 Doug. 594,
was of the latter class. The vessel had been restored and the
captors condemned in costs and damages by a decree of the prize
court. It was held, upon the fullest consideration, that the
defence was admissible under the general issue. The grounds
of the judgment were that the capture of the vessel and the imprisonment of the crew were not trespasses by the common law;
that, if wrongs had been committed, they were triable only by the
law of nations, and that no municipal court had authority to adjudicate upon the subject.
Such was the unanimous judgment of the court. If there were
no trespasses by the common law there, a multo fort ion, there was
by the common law, here, no conversion.
In Lindo v. Rodne,, 2 Doug. 613, the point of pleading was
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not raised, but the same doctrine of the want of jurisdiction in
the courts of common law was affirmed by Lord 1ANSFIELD in a
learned and elaborate judgment.
In _Ephinstone v. .Bedreechtnd, the seizure was by military
force on land. A judgment had been rendered by the Supreme
Court of Bombay, from which an appeal was taken. Lord TENTERDEN, delivering the opinion of the Privy Council, said:"We think the character of the transaction was that of a hostile seizure made, if not flagrante, yet nondum eessante helloregard being had both to the time, the place, and the person, and
consequently that the municipal court had no jurisdiction to
adjudge upon the subject; but that if anything was done amiss,
recourse could only be had to the government for redress. We
shall, therefore recommend it to his majesty to reverse the judgment:"' 1 Knapp P. C. R. 800.
"It should also be observed that according to the English law
-which, in this respect, is in accordance with the principles of
general law and public jurisprudence-no action can be maintained in a court of municipal law against the captor of booty or
prize. If an English naval commander seizes property as belonging to the enemy, which turns out clearly to be British property,
he forfeits his prize in the Court of Admiralty, and that court
awards the return of it to the party from whom it was taken; but
the case of Lecaux v. .Eden decided the question that no British
subject can maintain an action against the.captor. * * * * In
like manner, property taken under color of military authority falls
under the same rule. If property be taken by an officer under
the supposition that it is the property of an enemy, whether of a
state or of an individual, which ought to be confiscated, no municipal court can judge of the propriety or impropriety of the
seizure. It can be judged only by the authority delegated by the
Crown :" 8 Phil. International Law 192, § 180.
See also Alexander v. The .Duke of Tellington, 2 Russ. & M.
54; The Army of the Decan, 2 Knapp's P. C. R. 106; Nichol
v. aoodall, 10 Ves. 156; Hill v. Reardon, 2 Sim. & S. 431;
-Duekwork v. 1tcker, 2 Taunt. 2, 7; 1 Chit. Gen. Pract. 2, 18,
notes; Porte v. U. S., Devereux (Ct. of Claims) 171. These authorities are decisive upon the subject. If the action would not
lie against General Curtis, obviously it will not against his vendee.
The principal fact and the incident which followed are governed
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by the same rule: The case of The Admiralty, 13 Co. 53; Anonymous, Cro. Eliz. 685; King v. Broom, Carth. 398; Turner
Cary v. Neele, 1 Lev. 243; Bidley v. _Egglesfield, 2 Id. 25.
It was competent for Congress to give the jurisdiction; but it
has not seen proper to do so: Const. U. S., Art. 1, § 8. We hold
this objection to the plaintiff's right to recover well taken. This
conclusion does not conflict with the ruling of the Supreme Court
in MUitchell v. .armony, 13 ]low. 115. There the property in
question belonged to a citizen, and not to an enemy.
II. It remains to consider the second proposition relied upon
by the defendant. Chancellor KENT says:"In a land war, movable property, after it has been in the
complete possession of the eiemy twenty-four hours (and which
goes by the name of booty, and not prize), becomes absolutely his
without any right of postliminy, in favor of the original owner;
and much more ought this species of.property to be protected
from the rule of postliminy, when it has not only passed into the
complete possession of the enemy, but been bond fide transferred
to a neutral :" 1 Kent's Com. 120, last ed.
"The title to property lawfully taken in war may, upon general
principles, be considered as immediately divested from the original
owner, and transferred to the captor." * * * "As to personal
property, or movables, the title is, in general, considered as lost
to the former proprietors as soon as the enemy has-acquired a firm
possession, which, as a general rule, is considered as taking place
after the lapse of twenty-four hours, or after the booty has been
carried to a place of safety infra prcesidia of the captor :" Lawrence's Wheat. 629.
"If the hostile power has an interest in the property, which is
available to him for purposes of war, that fact makes it, primd
facie, a subject of capture. The enemy has such an interest in
all convertible and mercantile property within his control, or belonging to persons who are living under his control, whether it be
on land or at sea, for it is a subject of taxation, contribution, and
confiscation :" Dana's Wheat. § 256, n. 171.
Vattel says: "We have a right to deprive our enemy of his
possessions of every kind which may augment his power and enable him to make war."
"Whenever we have an opportunity, we seize on the enemy's
property and convert it to our own use; and thus, besides
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diminishing the enemy's power we augment our own, and obtain
at least a partial indemnification or equivalent, either for what
constitutes the subject of the war, or for the expenses and losses
incurred in its prosecution. In a word, we do ourselves justice."
* * * "As the towns and lands taken from the enemy are called
conquests, all movable property taken from him comes under the
denomination of booty. This booty naturally belongs to the sovereign prosecuting the war, no less than the conquests; for he
alone has such" claims against the hostile nation as warrant him
to seize on such property and convert it to his own use. His
soldiers, and even his auxiliaries, are only instruments, which he
eniploys in asserting his right. He maintains and pays them.
Whatever they do is in his name and for him:" Vat. Law Nat.
pp. 864, 865, Book 8, chap. 9.
It is usual to allow those making the capture to appropriate
more or less of the property to their own use; but the paramount
right and title are nevertheless in the sovereign, who may assert
them whenever it is deemed proper.
Congress, in passing the Act of March 12th 1863, in relation
to "captured and abandoned property," proceeded upon this
ground.
The doctrines thus laid down are in accordance with those of all
approved publicists. (See the authorities cited by the authors
from whom we have quoted.)
There can be no doubt that the facts, as found, bring this case
within these authorities. The commanding general caused the
cotton to be seized and brought within his lines. He had a firm
possession of it there for more than the requisite time. There is
no question as to the right of postliminy. The possession by
both the general and the purchaser was unchallenged by the
enemy. The purchaser conveyed the property to New York, and
there sold it.
Under the law arising upon these facts there can be but one
result.
We hold the second objection fatal, also, to the right of the
plaintiff to recover in this action. If he has any right which can
be recognised, it is against the Government, and must be asserted
elsewhere.
Judgment must be entered for the defendant, with costs.

FREEMAN v. FREEMAN.

Sprene Court of New York,-Broome General Term.
SAMUEL FREEMAN v. JULIA ANN FREEMAN AND JATIES W.
FREEMAN.
Where A. makes a parol gift of land to 33. and wife as long as they live, anl
the latter move on the land with the assistance of A., pay part of the taxes, make
valuable improvements and continue to reside on it for six years, the gift will be
treated in equity as in the nature of a contract executed, and A. will not be
allowed to recover possession of the land during the life of B. or his wife.
If B. should abandon the land and either directly or by neglecting to appear
and defend, connive with A. to eject the wife, the latter will nevertheless be entitled to a judgment in her favor for her own life.

Tuis action was brought to recover the possession of about 45
acres of land situated in the town of Taylor, in the county of
Courtland. It was tried before a referee. Upon his decision
judgment was entered and docketed in Courtland county in favor
of the plaintiff. The* defendant, Julia Ann Freeman, who alone
defended the action, has appealed from the judgment to the general term of this court.
Waters & Waters, for plaintiff.
Miner & Kern, for defendant Julia Ann Freeman.
BALcom, P. J.-The conclusions of fact, found .by the referee,
are as favorable to the defendant, Julia Ann Freeman, as are
necessary to present the question as to the correctness of his conclusion of law, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the possession of the land in dispute, notwithstanding the facts. The
answer, so far as the facts are concerned, is substantially sustained
by the conclusions of fact found by the referee.
The plaintiff purchased the land and paid 700 therefor on the
7Mh day of February 1860. He immediately wrote to the defendants, who were then residing in the town of .Smithville, in the
county of Ohenango, as follows: "February 1860. James and
Julia Freeman; I have just succeeded in buying a small place for
you. There is a small but comfortable log-house and barn on it.
You can get a good living on it after a few years. It is for you
and yours as long as you live, or as long as you have a mind to
stay on it. It is about half a mile from school. I shall be down
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with teams to move you on to it as soon as the going will permit.
SAMUEL FREEMAN."

Before the end of February 18603, the defendants and their
children, in pursuance of a parol gif: ,fthe land by the plaintiff
to the defendants, went into possessicu of the same and occupied
the same to the time of the trial of this action in March 1867.
When the defendants took possession of the land, only about 3
acres of it had been cleared. They cleared about 12 or 15 acres
more of the land and fenced the same, and they also built an
addition to the house on the land, being assisted more or less each
year by the plaintiff who resided not a great way off. The defendants paid a portion of the taxes on the land during their
occupancy of the same.
The evidence, aside from the plaintiff's letter, clearly sustains
the conclusion of the referee, that the plaintiff gave by parol the
land to the defendants and the use thereof so long as they or
either of them should live.
The plaintiff is the father of the defendant James W. Freeman.
For some cause, not explained by the evidence, James W. Freeman left his wife and the land and went to live with the plaintiff,
his father, the last of April 1866, and did not thereafter return
to the land or live with his wife, the defendant Julia Ann Freeman.
James W. Freeman has not defended the action; and it is probable (though there is no finding of the referee on the question).
he connived with the plaintiff to turn his wife and children, who
remained on the land,- out of the possession thereof. But as the
gift of the land was to the defendants, husband and wife, jointly,
James W. Freeman, the husband, could not do any act that would
deprive his wife of her rights, if she has any, by reason of the
gift and what she and her husband did upon the land.
The plaintiff sent his team after the defendants, when they
moved from Smithville upon the land in question, on the 16th day
of February 1860.
It is fair to infer from the evidence that all the plaintiff did
upon the land after the defendants went into possession of the
same, was prompted by the love and affection he had for the defendants and their children, and that he was actuated by the same
motive when he paid portions of the taxes on the land. According to his letter to the defendants, he did not think they could get
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a living on the land for the first few years after they should take
possession of the same. It undoubtedly was for that reason that
he assisted them after they took possession of the land.
It is hardly necessary to refer to the well-settled principle that,
in equity, part performance takes a parol agreement for the sale
of real estate out of the operation of the Statute of Frauds. (See
Mallins v. Brown, 4 Comstock 403.) According to our statutes
nothing in them "shall be construed to abridge the powers of
courts of 'equity, to compel the specific performance of agreements
in cases of part performance of such agreements :" 2 R. S. 135,

§ 10.
Whether a gift of land may be so far executed as to entitle the
donee to a specific performance of it by the donor, is the question
to be determined in this case.
In the case of The Lessee of Sfyler and Wife v. -Eckhart, 1
Binn. 378, TILGHM A.N, 0. J., in delivering the opinion of the
court, says: "It has been settled that where a parol agreement
is clearly proved, in consequence of which one of the parties has
taken possession and made valuable improvements, such agreement
shall be carried into effect. We see no material difference between
a sale and a gift; because it certainly would be fraudulent conduct in a parent to make a gift which he knew to be void, and
thus entice his child into a great expenditure of money and labor,
of which he meant to reap the benefit himself." And it was held
in that case, that a parol gift of lands by a father to his son,
accompanied with possession, and followed by the son's making
improvements on the land, is valid, notwithstanding the act of
frauds and perijuries.
Judge BLACK charged the jury, in Hughs, v. Walker, 12 Penn.
State Rep. 178, as follows, to wit: "Where a man makes a parol
sale and receives the purchase-money, he cannot set up the Statute
of Frauds against the validity of the contract. So, where he
makes a gift by parol, either to his son or to a stranger, if the donee
has gone into possession in pursuance of the gift, and made valuable improvements on it, the land so given cannot be claimed back
again, and the possession resumed by the donor." The judgment
in that case was affirmed. And COULTER, J., in delivering the
opinion of the court, said, in respect to the charge of Judge
BLACK to the jury: "I will let the charge speak for itself. It
will carry itself through."
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The principles laid down in the above two cases have never
been departed from by the courts of Pennsylvania, but have been
sustained and reiterated in other cases. (See Mahion v. Baker, 2
Casey 519.)
The following cases sustain to some extent the proposition that
the acceptance of the land in dispute, as a gift by the defendants,
and their occupancy of it, and their improvements on it, pursuant
to the gift, with the approbation of the plaintiff, render the gift
irrevocable: .King'sHeirs v. Thompson, 9 Peters 205; Pope v..
H7enry, 24 Vermont Rep. 560; -Duganv. -ittings,3 Gill 188.
The gift was executed by the parties, except that no deed was
executed by the plaintiff and delivered to the defendants, so as to
show that the defendants had a freehold estate in the land.
I am of the opinion we ought to hold that the gift partook of
the nature of a contract and became binding upon the plaintiff in
the nature of a contract, by a good and valuable consideration
that moved from the defendants, by their changing their place of
residence and spending six years of their lives upon the land
when it yielded very little, and by their making valuable improvements upon the land and paying taxes thereon. It is not improbable that the defendants, within the time they occupied the land in
dispute, might, if they had lived elsewhere, have earned and saved
property of greater value than this land. Had the defendant,
James W. Freeman, remained on the land with his wife, it would
have been unjust and tantamount to a fraud for the plaintiff to
have turned the defendants out of possession. And is it not more
unjust and more like fraud for the plaintiff, with the consent, if
not connivance, of James W. Freeman, to turn the wife of the
latter out of possession of the land?
It seems to me the conduct of the plaintiff towards the defendant, Julia Ann Freeman, should be characterized as fraudulent,
and be held fraudulent.
The gift of the land to the defendants was a direct encouragement to them to spend their lives upon it, labor on it, improve it,
and expend money upon it; and it would be against conscience to
allow the plaintiff to revoke the gift. And I am of the opinion
the gift should be specifically enforced, on the ground that it has
become irrevocable, and valid as a contract, by reason of the consideration that has moved from the defendants, in consequence of
the gift, which consideration they could recover of the plaintiff
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if its value could be ascertained or estimated in dollars. (See
.Rlodes v. Rhodes, 3 Sand. Ch. Reps. 279.)
The case is one in which justice cannot be done without holding
the gift of the land to the defendants irrevocable, and enforcing
it in favor of the defendant, Julia Ann Freeman.
The plaintiff's counsel relies on the case of MeCray v. .J1c aay,
30 Barb. 633, to sustain the decision of the referee. In that case
a new trial was granted on the ground that the defendant had
offered to prove a parol contract for the land in dispute and part
performance of it, which was improperly rejected. The question
whether the defendant could have held the land in dispute, in that
case, by a parol gift, was not decided; and it was not necessary
to determine that question, for there was a contract that controlled
the decision.
I am aware that the general rule is, that a gift, strictly speaking, is not regarded in the light of a contract, because it is voluntary, and without consideration. And yet every gift which is
made perfect by delivery is an executed contract; for it is founded
on the mutual consent of the parties, in reference to a right or
interest passing between them. (See 2 Kent's Com. 9th ed., p.
574)

It is no innovation to hold that the gift of the land in this case
partook of the nature of a contract, and became binding upon the
plaintiff as a contract, when the consideration, in consequence of
the gift, passed from the defendants. And it was not necessary
that the plaintiff should be benefited by the consideration. It
must be deemed to have passed from the defendants at the instance and request of the plaintiff. He solicited them to take the
land, and move on to it, occupy it, and improve it, at a loss to
them, for they could not get a living on it. He assisted them in
moving upon it; and although he was prompted to do so by the
love and affection he had for the defendants, he must be held
responsible for the situation in which the defendants were at the
time he undertook to turn them out of the posseision of the land.
My conclusion is that the defendants were, in equity, entitled
to a life estate in the land in dispute at the time the action was
commenced; and that the referee should have found, as a conclusion of law, that the defendant, Julia Ann Freeman, was entitled
to a judgment in her favor; and entitled to a deed conveying to
her and her husband the land in dispute, to have and to hold the
VOL.
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same so long as they or either of them should live. (See Lobdell v. Lobdell, 33 How. Pr. Reps. 347.)
Judgment should be reversed, and a new trial granted.
IBOARDMAN, PARKER,

and MURRAY, JJ., concurred.

United ,St ates -DistrictCourt, Bastern Districtof Pennsylvania.
BENNETT'S CASE.
ERBEN'S CASE.
Under the provision of the 14th section of the Bankrupt Law of 2d. March 1867,
excepting from the operation of the act the property of debtors exempted from
levy and sale by the laws of the state, a vested expectant interest of a bankrupt
in a sum of money payable at his own death, or at the death of another person,
may, in Pennsylvania, be set apart for the use of the bankrupt; so, however, that
its appraised present value, estimated as in cases of life insurance, does not exceed
$300, or that the bankrupt does not receive more than $300, if the value thus estimated exceeds that amount.

IN Bennett's Case, the bankrupt was one of the children of an
intestate, whose land having been sold under proceedings in the
Orphans' Court of the proper county of the state, a third of the
money produced was invested so as to secure to the intestate's
widow the receipt of the interest for her life, and to his children
the receipt, in equql shares, of the capital at her death. The
widow was living when the inventory and appraisement of the
bankrupt's effects were made, and at the date of the allotment
of what was set apart for his own use under the provisions of the
14th section of the Act of Congress. His expectant vested interest in the share of the capital payable at her death, was appraised
at its present value, estimated as in cases of life insurance. The
valuation was of less amount than $300. The bankrupt claimed,
and the assignee set apart for him, this item of the estate, as
excepted from the operation of the proceedings in bankruptcy, by
the 14th section of the Act of Congress of 2d March 1867, under
the head of property "1exempted from levy and sale upon execution or other process or order of court by the laws of the state
* * * to an amount not exceeding that allowed by those laws in
force in 1864."
In Erban's Case, the bankrupt had effected an insurance on his
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own life in a sum of money payable at his death to his wife. It
was alleged that he had been solvent when the insurance was
effected, and that it formed no part of his estate. But he had
paid the annual premiums after his insolvency. This insurance
had been appraised as part of the assigned estate; and had afterwards been claimed and set apart for the use of himself as exempt
under the provisions of the Act of Congress, and those laws of the
state upon which the question arose in Bennete's Case.
Upon the hearing of these cases in the Court of Bankruptcy,
CADWALADER, J., said that in the case of a similar expectant
interest in corporeal property, which interest could be levied on
and sold under an execution, he would have had no doubt of the
applicability of the exemption laws of the state. But the expectant interests here in question could not be sold under an execution. They could not be reached by a creditor in a court of the
state, otherwise than by way of attachment execution-a proceeding under which there could be no sale; in the strict sense of the
word. In each case, the question of exemption depended, under
the Act of Congress, altogether upon the effect of legislation of
the state, or depended upon a meaning of words, which was to
be determined according to the effect attributable to them by the
courts of the state under such legislation.
He therefore asked the assistance of two judges of the courts
of the state, Judge STRONG, of'the Supreme Court, and Judge
HARE, President of the District Court for the City of Philadelphia.
Judges STRONG and HARE sat accordingly as assessors; and
heard the questions argued by counsel on 16th September 1868.

I. S. Sharp, for Erben.
Dawes, for Bennett.
Bispham, contrA.
Judges STRONG and HARE, on the 18th of September 1868,
expressed their concurrent opinion that the expectant interests in
the money payable at the respective deaths of Irs. Bennett and
Mr. Erben, were included in the meaning of the words "property
exempted from levy and sale upon execution or other process or
order of the court by the laws of the state," and would be ex-
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empted under these laws to an amount not exceeding $300 in each
case.
CADWALADER, D. J.-The opinion of the learned assessors
appears from proceedings of the registers, and of assignees who
were lawyers, to coincide with prevalent views of members of the
legal profession in the state. I fully concur. In these cases,
therefore, the respective exemptions are sustained.
In Erben's Case several questions present themselves for consideration, one
only of which, by the suggestion of
CADWALTADE,

J., was argued before

and decided by the judges. These questions are as follows:1st. Was the policy in question the

-

property of 3ir. or M's. Erben ?
2d. Supposing it to have been Mr.
Erben's, was it not exempt under the
Bankrupt Act by virtue of the Acts of
Assembly of Pennsylvania of 9th April
1849 or of 8th April 1859 ?
3d. If not exempt by virtue of either
of these acts was it not exempt by the
Act of April 15th 1868?
1st. It is conceded that at the time the
policy was taken out Mfr. Erben was solvent and so continued for about nine
years, during which time he paid all the
premiums falling due. (After that time
he paid part of them only; the remainder being paid by Mrs. Erben out of
money given to her by friends.) That a
man may convey property to his wife
whilst he is solvent, provided there is no
intention on his part to defraud his creditors, may be considered as settled in
many of the states; and by the decisions
of the Supreme Court of the United
States it is valid, at least, as to subsequent creditors. See Story's Eq. Jur.
359 (n.), 428; Posten v. Posten,
4 Whart. 27; Saxten v. Wheaton, 8
Wheaton 247.
But this being admitted it is not the
province of the court, but of the jury,
to say whether there is a fraudulent in-

tent: Chambers v. Spencer, 5 Watts 404,
409.
And this was probably one of the reasons why the court refused to hear argument upon the point until the second
question had been disposed of. If the
policy, however, once became vested in
Mrs. Erben itcould hardlybe contended
that the payment of some qf the premiums
by Mr. Erben, after his insolvency, divested her interest and vested it in him.
There may have been a right of action
by Mr. Erben's assignee against Mrs.
Erben for money paid to her use; and
in a judgment obtained against her, perhaps, her interest in the policy could be
attached: GirardFireTns. Co. v. Fields,
9 Wright 129 ; Mfills v. Auriol, I
Smith's Lead. Cases 910; Godsall v.
Boldero, 2 Id. 292; Dalby v. Ins. Co.,
Id. 297.
2d. Was the policy excepted from the
operation of the 14th section of the
Bankrupt Act, which gives to the assignee the property and rights of the
bankrupt, but excepts from the operation
of this section the "household
and
kitchen furniture * * * and such
other property * * as is exempt from
levy and sale upon execution or other
process, or order of any court, by the
laws of the state in which the bankrupt
has his domicil at the time of the commencement of the proceedings in bankruptcy to an amount not exceeding that
allowed by such state exemption laws in
force in the year 1864." The Act of
Assembly of Pennsylvania of April 9th
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1849 provides "that * * * property
tothevalueof $300 * * * of any
debtor shall be exempt from levy and
sale on execution or by distress for rent."
The act then goes on to provide a manner of appraisingthe property which the
"debtor may elect to retain." The
early decisions of the Supreme Court
upon the construction of the term "property" in this act were very strict, and
declared " money, " among other things,
not to be included within it: Hammer v.
Frees, 7 Harris 255 (1852); Knabb v.
Drake, 11 Id. 489 (1854).
It was also said that nothing would
come within the terms of the law that
did not require or was not susceptible of
appraisement; it being required that the
whole law should be construed together.
In 1857, however, the court held that,
"Where the real estate of a debtor is
seized and sold under a judgment obtained on a mortgage given for the
balance of the purchase-money of such
real estate, and before the sale the debtor
notifies the sheriff that he claims the
benefit of the Exemption Law of 1849,
and desires to have an appraisement
made, such debtor is entitled to the
balance of the proceeds after the payment of the mortgage-debt and costs, it
not exceeding $300, in preference to
judgments obtained for debts contracted
since July 4th 1849 (the law having
provided that no debts contracted prior
to that date should be affected by the
act). AxMSTRONG, J., remarked, in
the opinion of the court delivered by
him, that the law " should receive a construction favorable to the benevolent object
of its enactment," that being "not only
for the benefit of the debtor but for his
family:" Hill v. Johnson .Park, 5
Casey 362.
BLAoK, C. J. (in 1852) had said it
should be strictly construed because,
among other reasons, it was in derogation of the common-law rights of the
creditor to take his debtor's property for

his claim. On April 14th 1851, the
"Widows' Act" was approved, whose
language and general purpose was the
same as that of the Act of 1849 ; and
in 1860 the Supreme Court held that
under that act IIthe widow of a decedent
may elect to take $300 as against the
creditors of her husband, out of any
money or evidence of debt belonging to
the estate; and in such case there is no
necessity for an appraisement :" Larrison's .Appeal, 12 Casey 130.
It may be noticed, however, that the
widow in this case chose promissory notes,
and after selecting them the money for
which they called was paid to the executors. But the evident liberal tendency
of the Supreme Court in construing the
law of 1849 seemed insufficient to satisfy
the legislature, the early decisions not
being yet overruled, and they therefore
passed the Act of 8th April 1859, which
extended to the class of persons named
in the Acts of 1849 and 1851, the right
to exempt "bank notes, money, stocks,
judgments, or other indebtedness to such
person." The question then was, in
this case, whether the term "property,"
in the Act of 1849; or the term "indebtedness," in the Act of 1859, included a policy of life insurance.
The court have not given the reasons
upon which they decided it to be "property," but it can hardly be doubted that
the liberal tendency of the Supreme
Court in its late decisions in construing
those acts and the evident liberal intent
of the legislature, as showed in the Act
of 1859, induced them to so extend the
term. It has been said that "property"
in a will includes every species of property, is a nomen generalissimum, "and
comprehends all earthly possessipns :"
Rosetter v. Simmons, 6 S. & R. 455.
, Although this would be a very comprehensive definition to give the term in
the statute in question, it yet shows how
comprehensive a term it may be held to
be where the intent is manifested by
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concurrent circumstances. I; w. - contended upon argument, also, th .t the
policy was an "indebtedness" 1 ithin
the meaning of the Act of 1859-a debitum in presenti solvendum infu,r,,. It
has been held in England that ., ife
policy will pass under a will by the term
"debentures and debts;" Llo qd 4.
Gould, Cases temp. Sugden 289-294;
l evuolds on Lif9 Insurance 173. And
although the Chancellor said he did not
wish to be considered as deciding the
"abstract point" that a life policy is a
"debt," the reasoning is very strong in
support of this view.
Many definitions of "debts," too,
may be found in the books sufficiently
comprehensive to cover a life policy.
See Bonvier's Dictionary, Debt; Gray
v. Bennett, 3 Met. 522, 526 ; 1 Bell
Appeal Cases 295.
And the text-books on insurance and
on bankrupt law speak of policies of life
insurance continually as "debts" and
"contingent debts :" Shaw's Ellis on
Insurance 299 ; Cooke's Bankrupt Laws
190.
As was suggested above, it is believed,
too, that it would be the subject of an
attachment execution : Lancaster Bank
v. Stouffer, 10 Barr 398; Girard Fire
Ins. Co. v. -ields, 9 Wright 129 ; .3ahon v. Kunkle, 14 Id. 216; Mills v.
Auriol, 1 Smith's Lead. Cases 910.
If this be true, it is a strong circumstance in favor of its exemption as it
would seem to be brought within the
clause "exempt from levy and sale on
execution," which was at first said to
be necessary, though the late decisions
are less strict. But a very important
point upon the general subject is whether
it is not exempted by the Act of 15th
April 1868, which provides that ccall

policies of life insurance or annuities
upon the life of any person which may
hereafter mature and which have been
or shall be taken out for the benefit of,
or bond fide assigned to the wife of such
person *
*
*
shall be vested in
such wife * * * full and clear from
all claims of the creditors of such person." If, therefore, the value of the
policy taken out by a husband for the
benefit of his wife does not exceed the
11amount" which was exempted by the
state laws in force in "1864," it would
seem that it might be exempted under
this later act ; even if the title to the
policy were vested in the husband at the
time he was declared bankrupt.
In
other words, the state laws exempting
property from levy and sale, may be
changed with reference to the articles
exempted if no change is made with reference to the money value of the exemption. The difficulty in Mr. Erben's
case with reference to this point was,
that the Act of 15th April 1868, had
been passed after he had been declared
bankrupt and the title to the policy, if
in him at that time, might be considered
as at once vested in his assignee so that
no subsequent act of the legislature could
take it out of him; for the Bankrupt
Act provides "IThat the foregoing exceptions shall operate as a limitation
upon the conveyance of the property of
the bankrupt to the assignee; and in no
case shall the property hereby excepted
pass to the assignee, or the title of the
bankrupt thereto be impaired or affected
by any of the provisions of this act."
If the title had vested in the assignee,
therefore, it would require a very liberal
construction to hold that it might be
taken out of him by a subsequent act of
the legislature.
I. S. S.

MATTER OF SUTHERLAND.

United States District Court.-Districtof Oregon.
MATTER or ROBERT SUTHERLAND, A BANKRUPT.'
A judgment for a fine imposed as a penalty for crime is not a debt within the
meaning of the Bankrupt Act, and not being included in the special provisions
allowing certain claims to be proved as debts, it cannot be proved against the estate

of a bankrupt.

THE state of Oregon proved a debt against the estate of the
bankrupt, amounting to $1394.46.
Upon the motion of the
assignee, the claim was set down for examination before the court.
From the evidence and admissions of the counsel for the state
and assignee, it appeared that on December 3d and 4th 1861, two
several judgments were given in the Circuit Court of the state for
the county of Multnomah, sentencing the bankrupt to pay two
certain fines, and that he be committed until the same be paid.
The debt proved before the register is a part of the sum for which
these judgments were given, the remainder having been paid.
Opinion by
J.-It
is understood from the admission of the counsel
that these fines were imposed upon the bankrupt as a punishment
prescribed by law for the commission of a crime, of which he had
been duly convicted. Indeed, a judgment that a party pay a fine,
in the absence of anything to the contrary, must be presumed to
have been given as a punishment for the commission of a crime.
The State Act of January 25th 1854, in force when these judgments were given, provides that "any convict" confined in jail
"for the non-payment of a fine," may be discharged from such
imprisonment by the commissioners of the county, if he is unable
to pay the fine; "but such convict shall not thereby be released
from the payment of such fine, but the same may be collected by
DEADY,

execution at any future time." Uiider this act the bankrupt was
discharged from imprisonment soon after the judgments were given.
Section 19 of the act declares that all debts due and payable
from the bankrupt at the time of the adjudication of bankruptcy
* * * may be proved against the estate of the bankrupt. Does
the term debt include a judgment for a fine? Blackstone (vol. 3,

1We are indebted for this case to the courtesy of
Am. LAw BEG.
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154) says, "the legal acceptation of debt is, a sum of money due
by certain and express agreement." This, however, is not the
popular acceptation of the word. Says the Supreme Court of
IMassachusetts (3 Met. 526): "The word debt is of large import,
including not only debts of record, or judgments, and debts of
specialty, but also obligations under simple contracts to a very wide
extent; and in its popular sense includes all that is due to a man
under any form of obligation or promise." This view of the subject was approved by Justice Story (2 Story's R. 432).
To ascertain, then, whether the word debt is here used in the
legal or popular sense, recourse must be had to the subject-matter
arid the context. Immediately following the general clause of
section 19, concerning debts, as above quoted, it is provided that,
"All demands against the bankrupt for or account of any goods
or chattels wrongfully taken, converted, or withheld by him may
be proved or allowed as debts, to the amount of the value of the
property so taken or withheld, with interest." The section then
proceeds to provide for the case of contingent debts and liabilities,
as well as unliquidated damages upon a contract or promise, and
then concludes: "No debts other than those above specified shall
be proved or allowed against the estate."
From all the provisions of the section, it is apparent that the
word debt is used in the legal or limited sense. If it were used
in the popular sense, it would not have been necessary to have
specially provided -that "demands for goods wrongfully taken,
&c., may be proved or allowed as debts." In the popular sense,
such demands are debts, and would have been included in the preceding clause providing for the proving "all debts."
A discharge in bankruptcy releases the bankrupt from all debts
which were or might have been proved against his estate: Sect.
34 Bankrupt Act. These fines were imposed upon the bankrupt
as a punishment for crimes of which he was convicted. If provable against his estate, he may be discharged from the payment
of them and from arrest made to enforce such payment.
In effect, this would be allowing the National Government,
through its courts, to grant pardons for crimes committed against
the state. A person convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to
pay a fine of a thousand dollars, would be relieved, by a discharge
in bankruptcy, from the punishment affixed by law to his crime.
I do not think that the act, while it reasonably admits of any other
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construction, ought to be construed so as to permit or allow such
a consequence.
Looking at the letter of the act or the nature of the subject,
either separately or conjunctively, it appears to me that a judgment for a fine, imposed as a punishment for a crime, is not a
debt provable against the estate of the bankrupt. Abstractly
considered, it may be proper that such a judgment should be
proved as a debt against the estate for the purpose of receiving
any dividend as a part payment thereof, without effecting a full
discharge of the same. Such a provision is found in section 83,
concerning debts created by fraud or embezzlement, or by defalcation, while acting as a public officer, or in fiduciary character.
But judgments for fines are not included in this special provision,
because not enumerated in it.
In The People v. Syalding, 10 Paige Oh. R. 284, it was decided
that a discharge under the Bankrupt Act-of 1841 did not discharge
a party from a judgment for a fine imposed upon him as a punishment for a contempt, committed by violating an injunction. The
contempt was merely constructive, and the fine imposed was
directed by statute to be ultimately applied in satisfaction of the
civil injury to the party who obtained the injunction. The Court
of Errors affirmed the decision: 7 Hill 301. On error to the Supreme Court of the United States, the judgment of the Court of
Errors was affirmed: 4 How. 21.
This case seems decisive of the question. Indeed, it goes much
further than the court is required to go in this case. The Bankrupt Act of 1841, in the use of the word debt, is much less qualified than the present one, yet the court held that it did not include
a judgment for a fine. In the case under consideration, the fine
was imposed purely as a punishment for the commission of an
actual crime; while in the case cited, the fine was imposed, nominally as a punishment, but in reality as a compensation to the
creditor for the civil injury he sustained by reason of the commission of the acts constituting the contempt.
The claim must be expunged from the list of debts proved
against the estate of the bankrupt.

MATTER OF THORNTON.

United St tes District court.--Distrietof North Carolina.
MATTER or

ALVIN G. THORNTON,

BANKRUPT.'

Real estate cannot be allotted or set apart by the assignee to a bankrupt under
section 14 of the Bankrupt Act, even though the personal property, excluding the
articles exempted by the state law, be less than the amount which the assignee
thinks should be allowed the defendant.
Money may be so allotted to the bankrupt.

TE following question was certified by the Register:Should an assignee in bankruptcy, in case there is a deficiency
of personal property, allot to the bankrupt an exemption in real
estate under section 14 of the Bankrupt Act of 1867-in other
words, does the Bankrupt Act give to an assignee the discretionary power of assigning to the bankrupt real estate to make up
deficiency when he (the assignee) is of opinion that the bankrupt's
exemption under said section 14 ought to amount to $500, and
there is not that amount of personal property belonging to the
estate over and above the articles specifically exempted under
sections 7 and 8, chapter 45, Revised Code of North Carolina?
John w, ffinsdale, for creditor.-I. The term necessaries is
used principally in the laws relating to infants and femes covert.
It is always defined as personalty, and never including real estate:
Smith on Contracts 216 and note reference to Tupper v. Caidwell, 13 Metcalf 563.
An infant can contract for necessaries; but, however necessary
land might be to himi its purchase by him would not be binding;
so in case of feme covert, who might be in the greatest need of a
home-a sale of house and lot to her would not bind her husband!
Freeman v. Bridgers, 4 Jones N. C. Law, p. 1; Seaton v. Benediet, 2 Smith's Lead. Cas. p. 431; Tyler on Infancy and Coverture 105, 112, 117, 120, 856, 358.
II. This is the proper time to take exceptions, and solicit the
opinion of the court: Bankrupt Act, § 14, Gen. Clause 50 (Rice's
.Manual); Gen. Ordbrs in Bankruptcy, Rule XIX.
B. & T. C. F ller, for bankrupt.
BROOKS, J.-I

have examined with care the authorities cited

I We are indebted for this case to J. W. Hinsdale, Esq., counsel.-Ems. Am.
LAw REo.
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by the counsel representing the creditors who except to the report
of the assignee. And I have also read with interest the argument
filed by the attorneys for the bankrupt.
This question has often arisen, and given rise to animated discussion in my presence, but is now for the first time presented
under the provisions of the law for my decision. I am well satisfied t'hat a fair and proper construction of the language used in
that part of the Bankruptcy Act, which relates to exempting, as
well as the true spirit and object of the law, will not justify or
authorize the action of the assignee in this case. The terms
'. other articles and necessaries," as used in the act, cannot be so
construed as to embrace land, without doing violence to every
meaning heretofore allowed those terms. It is quite clear, I
think, that if among the property of the bankrupt none, or not
enough, of the articles specifically mentioned in the act to be exempted be found, then the assignee may report as exempted other
"articles and necessaries" to make up the amount required, or
the deficiency (as the case may be) in the opinion of the assignee,
the whole not to exceed, under any circumstances, the value of

$500.

The suggestion of the counsel for the bankrupt would have
much weight if it was a matter of discretion. But the court can
no sooner award an article or kind of property, not properly embraced within the terms used, according to a faii construction,
than it could exceed the sum prescribed. The exemptions provided for by the Bankruptcy Act originated from the same spirit
that prompted the enactment of our legislative provisions in favor
of widows of intestates, awarding these provisions for their temporary support. And as that law restricts the commissioners in
the kind or species of property they shall award, so does the
Bankruptcy Act restrict the assignee as to the kind of property
he shall exempt. Now it often occurs that this all-important purpose of the law would be defeated, if under- no circumstances
money could be exempted to a bankrupt. Yet, from the language
of the law, if money could not be construed to be an article or a
necessary, it would be quite clear, I think, that money could not be
allowed. But it is as clear that money may be allowed, for it not
unfrequently occurs that money is quite as necessary to the temporary subsistence of a bankrupt and his family as any article
that can be mentioned.

RE ISAAC ROSENFELD.

As the widow of an intestate, upon the granting of administration, is presumed to be entirely destitute of such articles and provisions as are necessary for her support, so the Bankruptcy Act
presumes that every man who has been adjudged a bankrupt has
sworn truly, and has surrendered all his property and estate.
Then, if this be correct, he is alike destitute. Now, suppose the
bankrupt has been a merchant, a banker, and has surrendered a
large estate in "choses in action" and money, but not having
been a housekeeper, but from choice, from motives of economy,
or otherwise, he and his family, consisting of a wife and children,
have been inmates of a boarding-house-he does not own a bed
or a chair, or any article of provisions, consequently there is
nothing of the kind in his schedule; surely it could not be successfully contended that some money would not be necessary for
the temporary subsistence of such a family. Under such circumstances money may be exempted.
The assignee must advertise the real estate mentioned in his
report as exempted, and sell the same to the highest bidder, and
apply the proceeds as the law directs.
Let this be certified.

United States District ourt-Distrietof New Jersey.
RE ISAAC ROSENFELD, JR.
A., before insolvency and not in contemplation of bankruptcy, indebted to B. in
the sum of $2411, sold to B. an estate to the value of $10,000, and credited him
on his books for the said sum of $2411 at the time of sale. Afterwards A., when
insolvent and in contemplation of bankruptcy, had a settlement with agent of B.,
when the sum of $2411 was deducted from the amount of purchase-money. Held,
that the payment was really made at the time of sale, that it was not an appropriation of payments and that it was a legitimate transaction and not a fraudulent preference within the meaning of the Bankrupt Act. Where specification charges
that a particular debt was paid after passage of Bankrupt Act, and the proof shows
that it was paid before, and proof is offered that there were other debts not mentioned in specifications that were paid after passage of said act: Held, that the
creditors are bound by the specification, and such proof is inadmissible.
Servants' wages paid after the passage of Bankrupt Act, as necessary family
expenses, cannot be allowed as objection to discharge. Payment made to counsel
for services "1rendered and to be rendered," by bankrupt without fraud is not a
ground for refusal of discharge. Where a bankrupt, insolvent and in contempladon of bankruptcy, insured his life, it is an improper transaction. Insurance
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made upon house and furniture in pursuance of covenants in lease is not a fraudulent preference. Expenditures incurred by bankrupt while insolvent in support of
family, add the evidence is silent as to their character, the court cannot admit such

expenditures as a ground for refusal of discharge.

Tnis case came before the court upon specifications filed by
Marx & Co., creditors of the bankrupt, in opposition to his discharge.
Mr. Rosenfeld was a broker, residing in New Jersey, but doing
business in New York; and in May 1866, deemed himself to be
worth nearly a quarter of a million of dollars; but in one day,
owing to a sudden and expected fluctuation in the price of gold,
he became bankrupt. He at once made an assignment of all his
property for the benefit of his creditors, except his homestead and
furniture in Orange. In the schedule, however, annexed to the
assignment, the validity of the claims against his estate, growing
out of gold contracts, was denied, and has ever since been disputed by him. Negotiations for an amicable settlement with his
creditors were for a long time pending, and were in progress up
to within a week of the filing of his petition in bankruptcy.
His-counsel, Mr. Maclay, testified that so late as May 28th
1867, he had every reason to believe that such a settlement would
be effected. Most of the specifications originally filed related to
transactions which took place prior to the passage of the Bankrupt Act. Exceptions were taken to these specifications upon the
ground that acts done before the passage of the ifankrupt Law
were not a good cause for refusing a discharge. These exceptions
were sustained, and new specifications were filed in accordance
With the opinion of the court. It is these specifications which are
now to be considered.
.Abbett &. Fuller, for petitioner.
T. Y .cCarter and Goepp & Stern, for opposing creditors.
FIELD, J.-I.The first specification relied up6n is, That on the
28th of May 1867, being then insolvent and in contemplation of
bankruptcy, the bankrupt paid to his uncle, Isaac Rosenfeld, in
full, a debt of $2411.01.
That the bankrupt was insolvent and in contemplation of bankruptcy on the 28th of May 1867, has been clearly shown. If he
did, therefore, on that day pay to his uncle this debt of $2411.01.
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I think it would be a --'.tredalatpreference, contrary to the provisions of the act" wit';nn the meaning of the 29th section, and a
good ground on which .) n- use a discharge.
But was this payme- tin f.ct made on the 28th of May 1867?
The evidence shows ti-.t ,, the 4th of January 1867, the bankrupt sold to his uncle, ;saat Rosenfeld, certain real estate for the
sum of $10,000, and ha lie was at that time indebted to his
uncle in the sum of $2411. On the 28th of May 1867, a settlement was haal between :he bankrupt and Moses B. Maclay, Esq,
the agent of hiis uncle, anti in that settlement this debt of $2411
was deducted from the amount of the purchase-money, and the
balance paid in cash. Now it is insisted, that inasmuch as " the
purchase-money was not appropriated nor disposed of before the
28th of May 1867," therefore this payment of $2411 must be
considered as having been made on that day. But it seems to me
there is not the slightest- foundation for such an idea. The doctrine of appropriation of payments has no reference to a transaction of this kind. The payment was really made at the time of
the purchase of the real estate. From that time, the bankrupt
could have had no claim to anything but the balance of the purchase-money after the payment of the debt. When the settlement
took place on the 28th of May 1867, it was not for him to say
whether this debt should be deducted from the purchase-money or
not. He had no power to prevent it. Such would have been the
legal effect of the transaction, if nothing had been said or done
by either of the parties in relation to it. But the evidence would
seem to show, that in point of fact, Isaac Rosenfeld, the purchaser,
at the time of the sale, credited the bankrupt on his books with the
amount of the purchase-money, and charged him with ibis debt of
$2411, leaving a balance due to him, which was paid on the 28th
of May 1867. It was a legitimate transaction, and I see nothing
in it to sustain the charge of a fraudulent preference within the
meaning of the Bankrupt Act.
2. The second specification is, that after the passage of the act,
being insolvent and knowing himself to be so, and in~contemplation of bankruptcy, he paid to W. B. Ticknor & Co., a debt of
$154.30.
The answer to this is, that this specific debt was paid in 1866,
and not after the passage of the Bankrupt Act. But it is insisted
that there were bills of W. B. Ticknor & Co. paid in May and
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June 1867, and that these bills amounted in the aggregate to more
than $154.30, and therefore that the charge contained in the.specification has been substantially sustained. That is, the specification charges that a particular debt was paid after the passage of
the Bankrupt Act; and when it was shown that this debt was paid
in 1866, then proof is offered that there were other debts not
mentioned in the specification, that were paid after the passage of
the act. Such proof is inadmissible. The opposing creditors are
bound by their specifications. They cannot go beyond them, or
produce evidence outside of them. Where would be the use of
specifications if this were not so ? Instead of apprising the bankrupt of the specific grounds upon which his discharge was to be
opposed, they would only tend to deceive and mislead him.
3. The fifth specification is, that a debt of $158.44, due to J.
C. Harden, was paid after the passage of the Bankrupt Act.
But the evidence shows that this debt too was paid in 1866.
And then it is said, there was another debt of $66.45, that was
paid March 30th 1867. All that I have said with regard to the
second specification, is applicable to this.
4. So too with regard to the sixth and seventh specifications,
they charge that certain debts were paid after the passage of the
Bankrupt Act, while the evidence is that they were paid in 1866.
5. The eighth specification is, that after the passage of the
Bankrupt Act, he paid servants' wages, to the amount of $1400.
This charge is not sustained by the evidence. The bankrupt
testified, both before the register and in court, that this $1400,
mentioned in his schedule as servants' wages, covered a period of
about fourteen months: that while it was not the same during the
whole time, yet the average amount was something like $100 a
month; and that it was paid from month to month as it fell due.
No attempt has been made to discredit his testimony.
It seems, then, that instead of paying $1400 for servants'
wages after the passage of the Bankrupt Act, he paid but $400.
It was paid from month to month as it became due. It was a part
of his necessary family expenses.
But it is said Mr. Rosenfeld had no right to pay even $400 for
servants' wages, after the passage of the Bankrupt Act. As he
intended to apply for its benefit and avail himself of its provisions,
he ought at once to have reduced his establishment, retrenched
his expenses, discharged his servants, and adopted an entirely
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different style of living from that in which he had previously
indulged. Now, if the specific charge had been that the sum of
$400 for servants' wages, for a period of four months, was an
extravagant sum for a man situated as Mr. Rosenfeld w4s, to pay,
that it could not be fairly regarded as coming ander the head of
necessary family expenses, and must be treated as a fraudulent
preference, or payment or transfer of property contrary to the
provisions of the act, there might have been force and pertinence
in these observations. But the specification charges an entirely
different thing. It charges that the bankrupt, after the passage
of the act, paid $1400 for servants' wages, that is not only the
$400 which accrued after the 2d of March 1867, but also $1000
which had accrued prior to that day. Had this charge been true,
such a payment might well have been considered a fraudulent
preference. This was the charge that the bankrupt was called
upon to meet, and no other. He has met it, and has shown that
it is entirely unfounded.
6. The ninth and tenth specifications may be classed together.
They charge the bankrupt with having paid, after the passage of
the act, to Moses B. Maclay, Esq., the sum of $1000, and to
Messrs. Abbett & Fuller the sum of $1608.77, part of which
sums were for past professional services.
The charge contained in these specifications is somewhat vague,
it not being stated how much was paid for past and how much for
future services. It appears, however, from the evidence, that of
the $1000 paid to Mr. Maclay, $250 were for past services, and
of the $1608.77 paid to Abbott & Fuller, $608.77 were for past
services. The bankrupt had a right to employ counsel. Their
professional services were absolutely necessary for him. It was
natural that he should resort to those whom he knew and had formerly employed and in whom he had confidence. And it was
natural, that before consenting to act in a case which would necessarily require much time and labor, they should. insist upon being
paid an amount that would cover both past and future services.
Mr. Abbett, in his testimony before the court, stated that before
he consented to take charge of the case in bankruptcy, he told
Mr. Rosenfeld that he would have to pay him for what he had
already done for him, and also the sum of $1000. And Mr.
Maclay says he "charged him $1000 for services rendered and to
be rendered." The bankrupt was obliged to comply with these
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demands or forego the services of these gentlemen and employ
other counsel. This, no doubt, he might have done, and strictly
speaking, he had no right to pay them a debt due for past services. But I see no evidence of fraud upon the part of the bankrupt in these transactions, and I think it would be a harsh construction of the Bankrupt Act to pronounce them fraudulent
preferences within the meaning of the 29th section, and on this
account alone refuse a discharge. If the strict rule contended
for by the counsel of the opposing creditors were to prevail, the
payment of a debt, however small, through inadvertence or under
a mistaken sense of duty, and without any fraudulent intent whatever, would be sufficient in all cases to deprive a bankrupt of his
discharge-I do not believe that the framers of the act ever
intended that it should receive so rigid a construction.
7. The 11th specification is, that the bankrupt, on the 1st of
June 1867, knowing himself to be insolvent, and in contemplation
of bankruptcy, invested $641, as the premium for one year, on
two policies of insurance on his life, taken by him for the benefit
(if his wife and children.
The facts alleged in this specification are fully proved, and are
not disputed. The explanation given by the bankrupt of this
transaction is in substance, as follows: "On the 22d day of May
1866, he had made an assignment for the benefit of his creditors.
In May 1867 he entered into a negotiation with the assignees for
the sale of his wife's right of dower in certain real estate included
in the assignment. They agreed to give him $4000 for it, and he
determined to invest the money thus obtained in payment of preiriums upon a life insurance for the benefit of his wife. Believing
that this agreement would be carried out by the assignees, and
desirous of having the insurance effected with as little delay as
possible, he advanced $640 of his own money in payment of the
premiums, intending to replace it out of the $4000 as soon as
received. He further stated that he had consulted his. counsel,
.11r. Maclay, in relation to the matter, and understood him to say
that there was nothing wrong or improper in the transaction.
Mr. Maclay, says, however, that Mr. Rosenfeld must have misapprehended him, and that he gave him no such advice or opinion.
Tt turned out that the $4000 was never received from the assigne'es. They refused to consummate the bargain, and allowed the
VOL. XVHI.-4
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real estate to be sold subject to the right of dower. But the 8640
had been paid, and Mr. Rosenfeld wag unable to replace it.
If this is a correct account of the affair, while I see in it no
evidence of fraud on the part of the bankrupt, still I have no
hesitation in saying that it was an improper transaction, and one
of which the creditors have a right to complain. The bankrupt
clearly had no right to withdraw this money from the estate. It
belonged to his creditors. His counsel says that this cannot be
considered as a fraudulent gift or conveyance of any part of his
property. It was a mere loan to his wife, with the prospect of
having speedily in his own hands the means of repayment. But
the answer given to this, by the counsel of the creditors, is a correct one. If it were a loan to his wife to be replaced out of her
dower, then she is indebted to the estate to that amount, and the
bankrupt ought to have included the claim in his schedule of
assets. This, however, I understand the bankrupt virtually admits, and his counsel now consents that the court shall order the
schedule to be amended in such a way as to include this $641 in
the assets of the bankrupt. I see no objection to this course being
taken, and then there will have been not only no intention on the
part of the bankrupt to defraud, but no one in fact will be defrauded.
8. The 12th specification is, the payment of $118.80 for
insurance on the house and furniture at Orange. The answer
given to this is, that the payment of the insurance was made in
pursuance of a covenant contained in the lease. It was a part
of the rent, and if it had not been paid the lease would have been
forfeited. The counsel of the creditors suggests, as worthy of
remark, that the bankrupt had a term yet unexpired, in this
Orange property, which might have been a valuable asset in the
hands of the assignee. If this were so, then it was his duty to
pay the insurance, and instead of being a fraud upon the creditors,
it was for their benefit, for otherwise the lease would have been
forfeited, and there would have been no longer an unexpired term
to dispose of. This view of the case is not at all altered by what
the counsel further suggests, namely, that the bankrupt, by the
deed and release, which Mr. Maclay insisted upon his executing,
extinguished this term of years, and thereby deprived his creditors of the benefit of it, for such a charge is nowhere contained in
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any of the specifications. The payment of this insurance cannot,
in any point of view, be deemed a fraudulent preference.
9. The 13th, 14th, and 15th specifications relate to expenditures incurred by the bankrupt from May 22d 1866 to June 22d
1867, embracing a period of thirteen months. They were as follows :-Paid to
TMiscellaneous Tradesmen .
.
..
Grocer.
.
. ....
Butcher..

.
....

."

.

$3759 41
691 49
1159 23

Total

$5610 13

With regard to the amount paid to miscellaneous tradesmen, the
specification does not charge, nor is there any evidence to show
how much of this was paid prior to the 2d of March, the date of
the Bankrupt Act, and how much was paid afterwards. It is
true, that the bankrupt on his examination before the Register
says, that his probable expenditures during this period of thirteen
months was $655 per month; but this result was arrived at by
adding together the whole amount of payments made during this
period, and dividing it by the number of months embraced in it.
Whether his monthly expenditures were the same after the passage of the Bankrupt Act as they were before, nowhere appears.
They may have been very much reduced. The evidence is entirely silent upon this point. I presume it will not be contended
that a man had not a right after the passage of the Bankrupt Act
to spend money for his necessary family expenses, notwithstanding he contemplated availing himself of its provisions; and how
is it possible for me to say, in the absence of all evidence upon
the subject, how much of this sum of $3759.41 was paid after
the 2d of March 1867, and whether it was or was not for necessary
expenses ?
The same remarks apply to the grocer's and the butcher's bills.
They both cover a period of about thirteen months, extending
from May 1866 to June 1867, and it is not alleged in the specifications, nor is there evidence to show how much of them were
paid before the passage of the Bankrupt Act, and how much afterwards. Mr. Harden, the grocer, in his testimony before the court,
states that no wines were purchased, but only ordinary groceries,
and that they were paid for each week by Mr. Rosenfeld. He
also swears that the quantity of groceries purchased of him by
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Mr. losenfeld, after his failure was from $20 to $40 per week
less than it had been before.
10. The 16th specification is, that on the 28th of May 1867,
the bankrupt, knowing himself to be insolvent and in contemplation of bankruptcy, received from his uncle the balance of the
purchase-money for the house in Orange, and appropriated it in
part to the payment of preferred creditors, in part to the premium
on his life insurance of $641, and in part to extravagant living.
Now, it will at once be perceived, that this specification is
nothing more than a recapitulation of the several charges contained in the other specifications. The only difference between
them is, that there they are presented separately, while here they
are grouped together.
But inasmuch as these charges, when made separately, have all
been considered and dispoqed of. it will hardly be'thought necessary to spend time in the examination of them, when they are
thus combined.
I have thus gone over all the specifications relied upon as
grounds upon which to oppose the bankrupt's discharge; I have
carefully examined all the evidence in connection with them; I
have read attentively and duly weighed the elaborate, and I may
add, the very able arguments submitted to me by the counsel on
both sides, and the conclusion to which I have come is, that the
opposing creditors have not succeeded in making out a case, either
of "fraudulent preference, or fraudulent payment, gift, transfer,
conveyance, or assignment," by the bankrupt of any part of his
property, within the -meaning of the 29th section of the act.
The only charge upon which, if distinctly presented, I might
have felt some doubt and hesitation, is that which relates to the
style of living in which the bankrupt indulged, and the kind of
eztablishment which he kept up after the passage of the Bankrupt
Act. and after he had determined to apply for the benefit of it.
The counsel of the creditors have, in their argument, returned to
this subject again and again, and made many just and striking
observations in relation to it, and I confess that the impression
made upon my mind is, that the family expenses of the bankrupt
during the period in question were unnecessarily large-larger
than ought to have been incurred by one in his circumstances.
But it is only an impression, and a somewhat vague one too, for
the evidence furnishes us no means of knowing what these ex-

